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I rJ Till: s1_1pn1:nr-: CGIJPT GP THE STATE GF TJTAH 
11TAH, 
plaintiff-nespondent, 
,,'[,t.llnf' A. 8UNDY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. lqo13 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Aprellant, Claude A. Bundy, appeals his convictions 
of rape, for violation of Utah Code Ann."> 76-5-402 (1978), 
anCI forcible sodomy, for violation of Utah Code Ann. 
' 76-5-40 3 ( 1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found g ui 1 ty of rape and forcible 
soc1rimy in a jury trial held December 9, in, and 13, 1982 in 
thP Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge, presiding. 
On ,Jarillary 20, 1983 appellant was sentenced to serve five 
years to life in the Utah State Penitentiary for each count, 
s0ntences to run concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks af firmance of the cnnv icl ionc: 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THC FACTS 
In the spring of 1981 the victim, Sherry 
Christiansen, hegan babysitting her two young nieces, Tiffan, 
and Kimberly, the children of appellant and Sherry's oldet 
sister Lori Bundy (T. 20-22, 25, 34, 170-172). Sherry was 12 
years old at the time (T. 19). Sherry babysat her nieces on a 
regular basis through the end of 1981 ( T. 22, 2fi, 35). 
Appellant and his wife both worked. Appellant, a 
construction worker, worked swing shift and generally left for 
work at approximately 1:00 p.m., returning home between 11:30 
p.m. and midnight (T. 27, 39). Lori Bundy worked nights at 
Zion's Mountain View Nursing Home as a nurses' aid, and she 
usually went to work between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. and returned 
at approximately 7:30 a.m. the next day (T. 26, 38-39, 178). 
Sherry generally arrived at the Bundys • apartment 
around noon to begin babysitting, and could go home after 
appellant returned from work, approx imatley twelve hours 
later; however, Sherry regularly stayed overnight at the 
Bundys' apartment (T. 2R, 37-38). Because Lori Rund y worked 
all night, when Sherry stayed overnight at the Bundys' 
apartment, she was alone with appellant and the two sleepinq 
little girls (T. 26, 39). 
During this period of 1981 when Sherry bahys3t 
nieces, appellant induced her to engage in sexual intercourse 
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,.,,1 -,, t · ,,i <;nclrJ1ny with him 2S to 30 times (T. 41, fi4-fi7; R. 
,,, lit trial Sherry described in detail two such incidents. 
Th0 first such incident described by Sherry at trial 
, 1 .. ,1 ;,t the end of c1une or the beginning of July, 1981 in 
1 ,1 i I int 's apartrnent at approximately 12:30 a.m. after 
app"l Jant had returned from work (T. 41)1 Appellant 
,rndtr·ssr>n Sherry and had her lie down on his bed (T. 54-55). 
Appellant told her to open her legs, and then he placed his 
pe11is in her vagina ( T. St;-57). A few minutes later appellant 
placed his tongue in Sherry's vagina, fondled her breasts, and 
then again placed his penis in her vagina (T. fi0-61). 
The second occasion described by Sherry at trial 
took place in Sherry's home during the Christmas holiday in 
1981 (T.fi5). Appellant took Sherry into her bedroom and had 
her pull down her pants and lean over her bed. Appellant 
pulled down his pants, and approaching her from the rear, put 
\,is penis in her vagina (T. fifi). This was the last time 
appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with Sherry (T. 65, 
Fi 7). 
At the time of trial, appellant and his wife Lori 
wpre involved in divorce proceedings ini tated by appellant ( T. 
RK, 16 S-lfifi, 179-lRl). Lori testified at trial pursuant to an 
il•Jteement reached by the prosecutor and appellant's trial 
This was not the first time appellant had induced Sherry 
t" have sex with him. The first time had been in May or 
ly c!une 1981 (T. fi4-6S). 
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counsel in a discussion with th0 cn11t·t 111 ,·11 wil1•· i I I 1 
her testimony ( T. 7 5 , 8 1 ) . 
moved fol'." a mistt:"ial, cla iminq that Lnt i 1·n11l 1 n"t t, 
against appellant despite counsel's cons,·nt !Jecaw;e ,, 1,1,, 1 1 
had not personally consented (T. 74-P2, 159). 
the matter undel'." advisement (T. 82, 159-lliO, 16"3). 
At the close of the evidence, the j11rv foun11 
appellant guilty of !'."ape and fot:"cible sodomy (T. 219), .. 
court denied appellant's motion fol'." f'listrial (T. 220-2711. 
Appellant then brought this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S WIFE WAS PROPP.RLY PERMITTED TO 
TESTIFY. 
A. APPELLAN'T' HAD NO ARSOLUTE PRIVILF:GE 
AGAINST HIS WIFE'S TESTIMONY. 
Appellant argues that the trial court 
permitted his wife, Lori Runny, to testify aqainst him. 
Appellant contenc1s that he had an absolute privileqe against 
his wife's testimony under Utah Code Ann. 78-24-8(1) (lqs11, 
which states: "A husbanc1 cannot be examinec1 fol'." Ol'." against 
his wife without her consent, nor a wife fol'." Ol'." against her 
husband without his consent • 
Section 78-24-8(1), though, under its own terms, is 
not an absolute privilege. The statute lists thi:ee spPcit 1·· 
exceptions to the application of the mai:ital pl'."ivi]Pq<', , .. 111' 1 
-4-
11 , 11• ,, ,rf•pl ic·rli• \,. in thP instant case, and a general 
r•r t•>n: v1here it is otherwise specially provided by 
Tlw Rules of Eviclence provide otherwise. Rule 23 of 
. •,, p,Jl,,•, of Evirlence limits the privile']e only to testimony 
roncPrning confidential communications between husband and 
,.1[fe r1uring the marria']e. Appellant's trial counsel agreed to 
3 Jlow Lori Bundy to testify when assured that her testimony 
v1n11lrl rleal only with her anrl appellant's work schedules and 
not any confidential communications (T. 75-82). 
Siqnificantly, although appellant moved for a mistrial based 
on his wife's testimony (T. 79), he did not formally object to 
her testimony, nor rlid he move to strike any statement made by 
her on the grounds that it concerned confidential 
commun ica t ions. 
Evidence Rule 23 was intended to modify Section 
78-24-8 ( 1), accordinq to the Committee Note to Rule 21 in the 
1071 erlition of the Rules of Evidence as Adopted by the 
:01JTJremP rourt of JJtah (see Appendix A). 
rontrols, Lori's testifying was proper. 
Furthermore, Rule;:> provines: 
Thus, since Rule 23 
"Except to the extent 
to which they may he relaxed by other procedural rule or 
statute applicable to the speci fie situation, these rules 
shall apply in every proceeding, both criminal and civil, 
·•rr<l11ctiod hy or under the supervision of a court, in which 
r•1d0nce is produced" (Emphasis added). Since section 
'll-24-R ( 1) is more str inCJent than Rule 7.3, Rule 23 is 
controlling. 
-5-
In addition, Rule 101, recently cidoptP.J h•r t!, 1 
Court, states that the Rules of Evidence are to qove 1 n 
proceedings in Utah courts, with certain excertion uw1<'r 1 ,,. 
1101 not applicable here. The Committee Note to Rule lnl 
states: "Rule 101 adopts a general policy making the Rulr 
Evidence applicable in all instances in courts of the 
including situations previously governed by statute, excer•t 
the extent that specific statutory provisions are expressly 
retained." (Emphasis added. ) Moreover, the same Note 
expressly rejects the position of the Court in State v. 
Hansen, Utah, 5R8 P.2d 164 (1978) that statutory provisions of 
evidence law inconsistent with rules of evidence take 
precedence. Therefore, Rule 23 controls the of 
marital privilege since the provisions of Section 78-24-8(1) 
have not been expressly retained, and since Lori !3unnv's 
testimony did not concern confidential communications, such 
testimony was proper even without appellant's consent. 
It is also important to note that the foundation of 
the marital privilege outlined in Section 78-24-8 has been 
severely undermined. The section is based on the premise 
"there are particular relations in which it is the policy of 
the law to encourage confidence and preserve it inviolate." 
Id. The United States Supreme Court in Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), dealing with an accused's 
privilege against a spouse's testimony, noted that the marital 
privilege rule originally was based on the policy of 
preserving marital harmony, but reasoned that where one spn,,s· 
-6-
ic 11il Jing to t<;stify against the other in a criminal 
1,, "ceecling, "there is probably little in the way of marital 
11,irmony for the privilege to preserve." Id. at 52. The Court 
1 <Tognizecl that the original legal underpinnings of the 
'''"' i r "I privilege rule -- whereby a woman was regarded as a 
hettel ancl hacl no separate legal identity -- had long since 
bee" removecl in our modern society, so the re remained no 
contemporary justification for the privilege. Thus, the Court 
,:oncluded that a spouse may not be compelled to testify (£!_. 
Utah Constitution, Art, I,§ 12; Utah Code Ann.§; 77-1-6 
(1982)), but neither may a spouse be foreclosed from 
testifying. In other words, only the witness-spouse has the 
privilege; the defendant-spouse has no privilege. 
Although Trammel dealt with a federal statute, the 
Court's rationale in Trammel is applicable to the instant 
case. Since Lori Flundy willingly testified against 
appellant, her husband, and since appellant had already 
initiated divorce proceedings (T. 88, 165-166, 179-181), 
allowing Lori's testimony was not contrary to the underlying 
policy of Section 78-24-8(1). Therefore, appellant's claimed 
privilege is without foundation. 
Also significant is the fact that former Code 
Section 77-44-4 (1978), which was nearly identical to Section 
78-24-8(1) except for its express application to criminal 
proceedings, was repealed by 1980 Utah Laws, ch. 15, 1, 
the legislature's intent to remove the privilege in 
iriminal trials. This Court has held that its primary 
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responsibility is to give effect to the leqislnrtir<>'s 
underlying intent. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., lltilh, r, 1v 1 
P.2d 934 (1980). 
This Court in State v. Brown, 14 Utah 7d 324, 
P. 2d 930 ( lq63), held that it was error for the prosecutor 
comment on the failure of the defendant's wife to take the 
stand. In the instant case, however, appellant's wife 
voluntarily took the stand, and there was no statement, nor 
could there have been any statement, by the prosecutor which 
infringed on the witness-spouse's right to refuse to testify. 
Therefore, since the voluntary testimony of 
appellant's wife did not concern confidential communications 
between her and appellant, it was in compliance with Cviilence 
Rule 23, and the trial court did not err in permitting such 
testimony. 
B. EVEN IF APPELLANT'S PRIVILEGE WAS 
ABSOLUTE, HE CONSENTED THROUGH COUNSEL TO 
HIS WIFE'S TESTIMONY. 
Assuming arguendo that Section 78-24-8(1) controls 
the issue of marital privilege, appellant still cannot clail'l 
error because he agreed through counsel to his wife's 
testifying against him. Section 78-24-R(l) permits spousal 
testimony upon such consent. 
Prior to Lori Bundy's taking the stand, appellant's 
trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge held an 
off-the-record discussion in chambers concerning her abilitv 
-8-
tn testify. llrpel lant was not rresent at this niscussion (T. 
)';,). l\f'flel lant' s trial counsel agreen to allow Lori to take 
r,lfl,l ann testify as to her ann appellant's work schenules 
i 1 lifter her testimony, appellant moved for a mistrial, 
le1n11riq that he had not personally consente<1 to his wife's 
L'"stifyinq against him (T. 75-76). 
It is well settlen that a client is bound by his 
attorney's actions, although an attorney may not waive or 
surrender a funnamental right of a client without the client's 
consent. State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674, cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 11157 (1981); Matter of Hatfield, 231 !{an. 
427, 646 P.2d 481 (1982); State v. Collins, 133 Ariz. 21), 648 
P.2d 13'> (1982). Since under the rationale of Trammel, supra, 
appellant has no fundamental right to foreclose his wife from 
testifying, appellant is bounrl by his attorney's consent to 
Lori's testimony. 
C. ANY ERROR IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY 
OF APPELLANT'S WIFF. WAS HARMLESS. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence,and no error or 
nefect in any ruling or order in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any of 
the parties, is ground for granting a new 
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial 1ustice. court at 
every stage of the proceeding must 
disregarn any error or nefect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
-9-
Furthermore, this Court in State v. Eaton, \lt,1h, P.2•1 llJ 4 
(1977), set forth the following standard for determinin1 
whether an error is prejudical: 
••• if the error is such as to justify a 
belief that it had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the defendant's right to a 
fair trial, in that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there may 
have been a different result, then the 
error should not be regarded as harmless. 
In the instant case, the testimony of appellant's 
wife was merely corroborative. The information elicited from 
her, as to her and appellant's work schedules and the 
babysitting arrangements made with the victim, was also 
brought out in the testimonies of Douglas Christiansen, the 
victim, and appellant. 'J'hus, the alleged error could not have 
affected a substantial right of appellant's, if he ever had a 
substantial right in light of the rationale of Trammel, supra, 
nor is there a reasonable likelihood that absent Lori Bundy's 
testimony there may have been a different result. Therefore, 
any error was harmless. 
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POINT II 
rm IMPROPF:R OPINION TF:S"'IMONY WAS ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDF:NCE AT TRIAL, 
A. APPELLANT CANNOT CHALLENGE OFFICER 
S TFSTIMOtN BF:Cl\USE llPPELLMJT RAISED 
NO OBJECTION AT TRIAL. 
Officer Welby Scott, a detective with the West 
valley City Police Department, testified at trial that he had 
received information that the victim, Sherry Christiansen, had 
been sexually abused by her father, Douglas Christiansen, but 
upun investigation Officer Scott determined that the 
accusation was "unfounden" ( T. 149-151). Appellant nin not 
obiect to this testimony at trial. Appellant now claims that 
such testimony was improper ann prejudicial. 
It is well settled in Utah that a party cannot raise 
an issue for the first time on appeal absent exceptional 
circumstances. Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 
11971); State v. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252 (1983). 
Appellant in his brief alleges that there was a 
"family conspiracy" against him and that, therefore, the Court 
should review the evidence more closely (Appellant's Brief 
p. 9). /\sine from this bald assert ion appellant provides no 
evidence of such conspiracy. Thus, appellant has failed to 
establish that there are exceptional circumstances which would 
warrant review of the challenged testimony by the Court. 
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B. OFFICER SCOTT'S TESTIMOIN rrnrrr. 
Assuming arguendo that this issue is prof"'tl'! 1 ,, 1 
the Court, Officer Scott's testiniony was well within 11,. 
contemplated by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Eviclence, cited 1, 1 
appellant. 
Officer Scott was not testifying as an expert, so 
opinion or inferences in his testimony are limitecl by 
subsection (1) of Rule 56 to those which "the judge fincls (al 
may be rationally based on the perception of the witness Ann 
(b) are helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or 
to the determination of the fact in issue." 
Significantly, subsection (3) of the same rule 
states: "Unless the juclge exclucles the testimony he shall 
deemed to have made the finding requisite to its admission." 
Since the trial court clicl not exclude the testimony, the trial 
judge must have determined that the testimony passed the test 
of subsection (1). 
In any event, Officer Scott's testimony that the 
allegation against the victim's father was unfounded was both 
rationally based on his perception of his investigation of the 
allegation and helpful to a clear unclerstancling of his 
testimony or to the determination of the substance of the 
allegation. Thus, Officer Scott's testimony complied with ,he 
requirements of Rule 56(1) and did not constitute improper 
opinion testimony. 
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POINT III 
l\PPF.LLAtlT Hl\S WAIVE:[) HIS OBJECTION TO ANY 
l\LLP<:Pn m:n:C'r IN '!'HP, INFORMATION BY 
f'l\ILING TO OBJP,CT THERETO BEFORE TRIAL. 
Appellant in his Supplemental Brief claims that the 
is fatally defective because it fails to state a 
specific date on which the offenses were committed. Appellant 
has not previously raised such objection. 
Rule 12(b)(l), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
requires that any objection to the information be raised at 
least S days prior to trial, unless the objection is that the 
information fails to show jurisdiction in the court of to 
charge an offense. Subsection (d) of the same rule provides 
that failure to so object constitutes a waiver. See State v. 
Hall, Utah, 671 P.2d 201 (lq83). 
\·/here, as in the instant case, the defendant does 
not object to the information before or at trial, this waiver 
rule is analogous to the rule that a party cannot raise an 
issue for the first time on appeal. Wagner v. Olsen, supra; 
State v. Steggell, supra. 
Appellant does not challenge the jurisdiction of the 
trial court; appellant claims only that the information, by 
failing to allege a specific date,2 did not state with 
sufficient particularity the actual transaction on which the 
The victim could recall only the general period of time, 
nrit the specific dates (T. 41, 63-65). 
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charges are basecl. Appellant contends thilt this al 1"'1"'1 
defect prejudicially impaired his ahility to prepare a 
defense. 
Appellant's own authorities refute this contc·llLl% 
Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Proceclure, citecl hv 
appellant, states: "Such things as time, place, means, 
intent, manner, value ancl ownership need not he alleged unJesc 
necessary to charge the offense." (Emphasis added.) That 
same subsection requires only that the information "charge 
offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted by using 
the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or 
by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense 
sufficient to give the clefendant notice of the charge." 
The information in the case at bar used the 
statutory names of the two offenses chargecl: rape ancl 
forcible sodomy. Thus, the information complied with the 
above statutory requirement and furthermore fulfilled the 
primary purpose of an information, which is, as stated by this 
Court in State ex. rel. Cannon v. Leary, Utah, 646 P.2d 727 
(1982), "to put the clefendant on notice of the charges leveleo 
against him. "Id. at 731. 
Appellant attempts to establish that the "time" 
element was necessary to charge the offense ancl so shoulrl 
been alleged because, appellant claims, failure to alle'le the 
specific date prevented him from using the alibi defense. 
Appellant cites State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 7 h4 
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il'J'l'l), in support of the proposition that the issue of time 
milY lie v<ery important where defendant's defense is alibi. 
, , 1 !'our t noterl in Cooper, however, that the defendant had 
,,J.,,inced the defense of alibi and so granted the defendant 
",, r "lief on that basis. 
In the instant case, appellant also did not raise 
the defense of alibi. Thus, he should likewise be granted no 
relief because of the information's failure to allege the 
precise time of the offense. 
Moreover, this Court has stated: "It is therefore 
well established in this jurisdiction that where time is not 
of the essence of the crime the exact time is immaterial 
State v. Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 262 P. 113, 116 
(lg27). Time is not the essence of rape or forcible sodomy, 
so the exact time is immaterial. 
Therefore, the information's failure to allege a 
sr>:'ci f ic date on which the offenses were committed does not 
render it defective. The information adequately charged an 
offense, putting appellant on notice of the charges leveled 
against him. Thus, appellant's failure to object to this 
alleged defect at least S days before trial constitutes a 
waiver. 
-15-
POINT IV 
THE VICTIM'S CONSENT OR LACK Tl!ERFOF IS 
NOT AT ISSUE SINCE SHE WAS UNDER 14 YEARS 
OF AGE. 
Appellant in his Supplemental Brief argues that, 
despite statutory prov is ions to the contrary, the prosc·cut 1 
is required to establish that the victim of rape and forcible 
sodomy did not consent to the sexual acts even where the 
victim is under 14 years of age. Based on this argument, 
appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to 
discharge him at the end of the State's case-in-chief on the 
grounds that the State had not proved lack of consent. 
However, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406(7) (1978) provides 
that certain sexual acts, including sexual intercourse anct 
sodomy, are without consent of the victim where the victim is 
under 14 years of age, as was the victim in the instant case. 
Thus, consent was not at issue in the instant case. Appellant 
does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence as to the 
other elements of the crimes charged. 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony of appellant' s wife was within the 
scope contemplated by Rule 23, Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
modifies the marital privilege claimed by appellant uncter Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78-24-8(1). Even if Rule 23 did not modify the 
statute, appellant consented through counsel to his wife's 
-16-
re ( In any event, any error in permitting 
,; ,, 1, 1, t i11H1ny was harmless since it did not affect a 
,,,, '1,1rit ial rioht of aprellant nor was there a reasonable 
', 1,,,,,,1 rhat ahsent the testimony of appellant's wife there 
1 ''"'"' been a different result in light of the fact that 
l•·r \Pstimony was merely corroborative and added nothing 
uni•.JllP to the State's case. 
Appellant cannot challenge Officer Scott's testimony 
or the information since he did not timely object to the 
alleged errors or defects connected therewith. Even so, 
appellant's objections are without merit. Finally, consent 
was not at issue at trial because the victim was under 14 
years of age. 
19 84. 
Therefore, the convictions below should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this of January 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy 
of the foregoing brief to Edwin F. Guyon, attorney for 
rlefPndant, 820 Newhouse Building, Ten Exchange Place, Salt 
City, Utah R4114, day of January, 1984. 
(jo±N cu1 PU-crlv 
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APPENDIX A 
This Appendix contains a photo copy of Rule 23 and 
"'·- •1npa11ying Note as they appear in Carvel Harward's copy of 
the 1971 edition of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Mr. Harward 
is the Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney who prosecuted this 
below. The handwritten annotations and underlining are 
Mr. Harward's. 
-18-
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or integrity or their vpposites, shall be inadmissible; (d) 
evidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only 
as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall be 
inadmissible. 
NOTE: Clause (a) appears consistent with our present procedure as 
does clause (b). Clause (c) contains the same limitation on character 
testimony for impeachment purposes as appears in Rule 21 in respect 
to a convicbon of a crime. Clause (d) prohibits proof of specific 
instances of conduct to prove character trait for impeachment pur-
poses. (See Rule 46, however, on manner of proof of character 
where the same is an issue in the case.) 
Rule 23. Privilege of Accused 
( 1) Every person has in any criminal action in 
which he is an accused a privilege not to be called as a 
witness and not to testify. 
(Z) An accused in a criminal action has a privilege 
to prevent his spouse from testifying in such action with 
c. .. to any confidential rommunication had or made 
them while they were husband and wife, except-
ing only (a) in an action in which the accused is charged 
S with (i) a crime involving the marriage relation, or (ii) a 
crime against the person or property of the other spouse 
or the child of either spouse, or (iii) a desertion of the 
other spouse or a child of either spouse, or (b) as to the 
communication, in an action in which the accused offers 
evidence of a communication between himself and his 
spouse; but a wife is not compelled tq testify against 
Jmsband, nor a husband against his wife . 
14 
(3) An accused in a criminal action has nn p1 , , 1 ,, 
to refuse, when ordered by the iu<lge, to suLm1! Iii, i,, 
tn ex a min a uon or to do any act 111 the prcscme "CT J1, 
j'i:tdge Or the tner 1 the fact exec t to refuse to te,(J; 
xcept at he shall not be re uire to ive evide11 ;, 
provided by Section 12 Ari I 1, 
NOTE: Subdivision (t) of this rule conforms to tbe constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination. Subdivision (2) modifies 
78-24-8 ( t) prohibiting one spouse from testifying against the other 
and limits tbe privilege to confidential communications, Subdivisioo 
(3) deals s?lely wit!1 privilege. It does not purport _to change or 
affect '.'onsbtubonal _immumbes, It 1s supported by history, logie<J 
analysis, and the weight of authonty. (See 8 W1gmore on Evidence 
(3rd Ed.) Sec. 2265.) 
Rule 24. Definition of Incrimination 
A matter will incriminate a person within the mean· 
ing of these Rules if it constitutes, or forms an essential 
part of, or taken in connection with other matters dis· 
closed, is a basis for a reasonable inference of such a vioJa, 
tion of the laws of this State or of the United States as 
to subject him to liability to punishment therefor, unless 
he has become for any reason permanently immune from 
punshment for such violation. 
Rule 25. Self-Incrimination: Exceptions 
Subject to Rules 23 and 37, every natural per!on has 
a privilege, which he may claim., to refuse to disclose in ' 
15 
